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13. ABSTRACT
This paper presents a method to quantify the value of reconnaissance for both direct and indirect
fire weapons for the defense-in-sector battle scenario. The Lanchester area fire model and the Helmbold
equations were modified to allow the lethality of the defending blue force to be increased as they gained
more combat intelligence about the attacking red force, thus modeling intelligence as a true combat
multiplier. By adjustments made to parameters in the model, the lethality of blue direct and indirect fire
weapons could be adjusted based on the quantity and quality of their intelligence assets. With information
from a computer database, and the COMAN model, maximum likelihood attrition rate estimates were
calculated for both red and blue forces for ten heavy defensive battles conducted at the Army's National
Training Center. In each battle, the red force attrition rate was fitted to a curve which represented a
percentage of blue's full potential, represented here by the square law. Using this model in a combat
simulation, and with some preliminary work with comparable systems, one could implement a change in
blue's intelligence assets and then provide a quantitative measure of the effect that this had on the outcome
of a battle.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a method to quantify the value of reconnaissance for both direct
and indirect fire weapons for the defense-in-sector battle scenario. The Lanchester area
fire model and the Helmbold equations were modified to allow the lethality of the
defending blue force to be increased as they gained more combat intelligence about the
attacking red force, thus modeling intelligence as a true combat multiplier. By
adjustments made to parameters in the model, the lethality of blue direct and indirect fire
weapons could be adjusted based on the quantity and quality of their intelligence assets
With information from a computer database, and the COMAN model, maximum
likelihood attrition rate estimates were calculated for both red and blue forces for ten
heavy defensive battles conducted at the Army's National Training Center. In each battle,
the red force attrition rate was fitted to a curve which represented a percentage of blue's
full potential, represented here by the square law. Using this model in a combat
simulation, and with some preliminary work with comparable systems, one could
implement a change in blue's intelligence assets and then provide a quantitative measure
of the effect that this had on the outcome of a battle
in
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Due to its nature, reconnaissance has been evaluated primarily in a qualitative sense
in the past. However, the ability to quantify this value and directly apply this information
to modeling our warfighting capabilities has not been accomplished. Without this
measure, it is impossible for models to accurately weigh the costs and benefits of
reconnaissance systems.
For a unit in battle, it is common knowledge that the proper use of intelligence
assets will serve as a combat multiplier. However, current models generally have
shortcomings when portraying the quantitative effect that they have on the outcome of
the battle. The methods presented in this paper effectively translate enemy information
into a weighting factor on the unit's ability to attnte the enemy. Two models are needed:
an area fire model which is used for the indirect fire weapons such as artillery and
mortars, and an aimed fire model which is used for the direct fire weapons such as tanks
and missiles.
Lanchester equations have long been used to model force-on-force attrition under
many different scenarios. Also the problem of assessing the value of the information
gained from reconnaissance is not new. However, most models are somewhat tentative
and incomplete by their own admission. The attempt in this thesis is to construct and
validate a model which can be implemented throughout the modeling community.
Two different equations are used to model area and aimed fire However, the
intuitive argument behind both equations is the same; blue's weapons become more lethal
as the blue force gains more knowledge about red's course of action (COA). In the area
fire model, as blue gains information regarding red's COA, they can effectively reduce
the area covered by their indirect fire weapons and improve specification of their target
lists. A decrease in the area occupied by the red force results in increased effectiveness
throughout the fire support battlefield operating system and hence, an increase in the
lethality of their indirect fire weapons. The Lanchester linear law is used to model this





The ratio is continually updated until the close battle commences, at which time red's
attrition rate from blue's indirect fire weapons becomes fixed.
In the aimed fire model, the rate at which blue attnts red is bounded above and
below by the square and the linear law Lanchester equations, respectively. As blue's
perception of red's course of action approaches the ground truth, the blue force becomes
more lethal. This is accomplished through use of a modified Helmbold equation by
increasing what is known as the Weiss parameter. Similarly, if blue's perception deviates
from ground truth, the Weiss parameter decreases. Ultimately the battle will be fought
with blue attnting the red force at some percentage of their total potential, represented by
the square law.
A positive correlation was shown to exist between the performance evaluation of a
unit's use of intelligence information on the battlefield and the rate at which it attnted the
red force. This was done with a nonparametnc rank correlation technique and the use a
subjective scoring of the performance narrative along with the attrition rate estimate
obtained from the actual National Training Center defensive battle data. This result
further emphasizes the need for combat simulations to quantitatively account for the use
of intelligence assets in their attrition models
The aimed fire model was applied to ten defensive battles conducted at the Army's
National Training Center (NTC), and a Weiss parameter value was obtained for each of
the battles, which represents a quantitative measure of effectiveness for each battle.
Further research was discussed to include extending the model to the heterogeneous
case Also discussed was the use of these attrition models in the Future Theater Level
Model (FTLM). The FTLM is a new simulation which is in need of an attrition model,
and would be well served to exploit the strengths of the equations presented in this study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to provide an analytical tool which quantitatively
demonstrates the value of reconnaissance as a function of time. Additionally, this thesis
will provide recommendations for further development of the model.
Considering the current emphasis on reduced spending and the downsizing of the
military forces, it is necessary to focus on the most efficient use of our resources
Additionally the transition from the Cold War Era into a multi-polar world and a
contingency force military structure demands that we maximize the combat effectiveness
of our military forces. Now, more than ever it is critical to gain quick victory by rapidly
massing fires instead of troops and engaging the enemy at the maximum effective range
of our weapon systems The information collected through reconnaissance missions
helps us to accomplish this and continues to serve as an important combat multiplier for
commanders.
For a unit in battle, it is common knowledge that the proper use of intelligence
assets will serve as a combat multiplier. However, current models generally have had
shortcomings when portraying the quantitative effect they have on the outcome of the
battle. The methods presented in this paper effectively translate enemy information into
a weighting factor on the unit's ability to attnte the enemy Two models are needed: an
area fire model which is used for the indirect fire weapons such as artillery and mortars,
and an aimed fire model which is used for the direct fire weapons such as tanks and
missiles. Once the model development has been discussed, the data which were gathered
from ten battles conducted at the Army's National Training Center (NTC) will be
described Finally, these data are used to show how the units can be rated according to
the magnitude of what is referred to as the Weiss parameter. This is a number which can
be interpreted as the percentage of the unit's full potential to attnte the enemy.
Lanchester equations have long been used to model force-on-force attrition under
many different scenarios [Refs. 1 and 2]. Also, the problem of assessing the value of the
information gained from reconnaissance is not new [Refs. 3 and 4] However, most
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models are somewhat tentative and incomplete by their own admission. The attempt in
this thesis is to construct and validate a model which can be implemented throughout the
modeling community.
Due to its nature, reconnaissance has been evaluated primarily in a qualitative sense
in the past. However, the ability to quantify this value and directly apply this information
to modeling our warfighting capabilities has not been fully realized. Without this
measure, it is impossible for models to accurately weigh the costs and benefits of
reconnaissance systems.
In Chapter II, some of the traditional Lanchester equations are presented and then
modified to reflect the use of intelligence as a combat multiplier. These are presented
along with intuitive arguments as to why these modifications satisfy military judgment.
Also discussed are the basic battlefield scenarios for the area and aimed fire models for
use throughout the thesis.
Chapter III describes the data which were acquired from the Army Research
Institute, at the Presidio of Monterey (ARI-POM), from 10 defensive battles fought at the
National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Also described are the
selection criteria used in choosing these ten battles. These data forms include numerous
database tables Additionally the form and structure of the database provided by the
ARI-POM, and how it was manipulated and cleaned for the purpose of this thesis are
discussed These data forms include numerous database tables as well as the narrative
take home package (THP). The final discussion in this chapter describes how this
information was reorganized into a consolidated data table which will be used and
expanded in the analysis.
The analysis of the data is presented in Chapter IV, where the method and
calculations which produced the COMAN model maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
of various attrition rates from the NTC data are described. Also the battles are ranked
according to two measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and a positive correlation is shown
to exist between how well a unit uses its intelligence assets and the rate at which it
actually attntted the red force. Finally a method is described which quantitatively
measures the effectiveness of the use of reconnaissance and the processing of intelligence
information using the NTC battle data with the modified Helmbold equations.
The final chapter contains the conclusions of the study and several suggestions for
further research. The discussion outlines possible extensions of the models,
opportunities to employ these results and a summary of the ongoing research
II. THE LANCHESTER MODELS
In this chapter some of the traditional Lanchester equations are presented and then
modified to reflect the use of intelligence as a combat multiplier. These are presented
along with intuitive arguments as to why these modifications make sense. The resulting
equations will be applied in Chapter IV, Analysis. Also discussed are the basic
battlefield scenarios for the area and aimed fire models for use throughout the thesis.
A. GENERAL
The traditional Lanchester equations can be written as the
linear law: ^- = -(XbRB, (l)
square law: ^ = -peB, (2)
and the
dR
where R and B are the respective red and blue force sizes, ocb represents blue's ability to
attrit red with area fire, and (3b represents blue's ability to attrit red with aimed fire.
Now it can be shown that the square law is closely related to the linear law. In fact,
the two attrition rate coefficients can be written in terms of one another. Consider
representing the square law attrition rate coefficient as
PB = rB xP ssk , (3)
where rB is the firing rate of blue's weapons and PMk is the probability of a kill per round
fired. In the area fire case, assuming rB to be a constant, the expected number of kills per
round can be thought of as
Pssk = A L xi = ^XR, (4)
where A
L
is the lethal area of one round, R is the number of red targets, and a^ is the area
occupied by the red force. In words it can be written as
Pssk = (lethal area of round) x (target density) (5)
Equations (2), (3), and (4) above provide the following expression for the attrition rate
[Ref 5];
f = r B^RB (6)
Equation (6) is another way of expressing the linear law since it depends on R The
initial statement regarding the similarities in the two attrition rate coefficients can easily
be shown since
and
«B = rB i|, (7)
(3 B = rB^-R = aBR (8)
B. AREA FIRE
The Lanchester Linear Law is the foundation for the equation used here The idea is
to reward the blue force for the information it has gained by increasing the rate at which
it attrits the red force. The more intelligence blue gathers regarding red's probable
courses of action (COA), the more lethal blue's area fire weapons become. This increase
is determined by the ratio j1-
.
Consider the following scenario which is depicted in Figure 1. The blue force
defends against red who will attack along some combination of five available avenues of
approach (AOA), each of which has similar physical characteristics and is five square
kilometers in size. At time, t
n ,
the blue force has no information regarding red's COA.
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Therefore he assesses the use of each AOA to be equally likely during the attack. This
means the blue indirect fire assets are divided equally to cover each of the five AOAs.
Blue's reconnaissance objective is to determine how much of red's strength will come
down each AOA, as well as the force composition. Suppose for now that rB is a constant,
and use the initial conditions shown in Table 1
.
Figure 1. First Area Fire Scenario
TABLE 1. EXAMPLE PARAMETERS FOR THE AREA FIRE MODEL
Parameter Value Units
R= 1250 elements
B = 24 area fire weapons
A, = 0.00785 square kilometers
* = 25 square kilometers
rB = 4
rounds per weapon per minute
This yields the following attrition rate for the red forces at time t
,
dR a f 0.00785 \
dt I 25
kills
<£ = _4pssp (1250K24) =
-37.7-S-. (9)
y minute





p B = 4f^^l(1250)-1.57. (li)
V
25 )
Now suppose the blue force has gained some information regarding red's current
activity and location. Based on this information he reevaluates the enemy's probable
COA Suppose further that blue determines that the force will use only AOAs 1, 2 and 3
as shown in Figure 2. It follows that he will allocate his indirect fire assets according to
these same proportions. Blue has in effect reduced the area of his target. This will result
in a higher attrition rate against red for blue's area fire weapons, which is calculated as
§ = ^M22B](1250)(24) = -62.8-P»-. (12)dt I 1 5 / v /\/ minute
Blue will continue to update the probable enemy COAs and reallocate his area fire
assets. Provided that blue's intelligence was accurate and that his analysis was correct, he
will ultimately attnt the red forces with area fire at a higher rate than if he had not used
his reconnaissance assets. The graph in Figure 3 below shows the effect of reducing a^,
while all other parameters are held constant. Each line represents a change in the total
area occupied by the red forces. The attrition rate of the blue forces is held constant at
the arbitrary value of 3 percent.
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Figure 3. Effect Of a On Enemy Force Size
C. AIMED FIRE
Lanchester's square law is the basis for the equation used in this section, but here it
is not related to the area of the AOAs, but instead, the number of AOAs. However, the
key aspect of this model is similar to the area model in that the blue force gains
information through reconnaissance efforts and applies this knowledge to increase his
combat effectiveness. The aimed fire model does require a slightly different approach.
The Helmbold modification of Lanchester's square law serves as a starting point to model
the situation. The Helmbold equation is written as
f = -0BffpB,
where Pb is the rate at which blue attnts red using aimed fire, and co is referred to as the
Weiss parameter Here, as before, both B and R are force strengths as a function of time
Traditionally Helmbold's equations have been used to account for inefficiencies of
scale for a larger force when the initial force sizes are grossly unequal [Ref. 5]. In
Equation (13) above, the force ratio term is less than one, and the term f | j can be
interpreted as a weighting factor on the red attrition rate. Helmbold argued that a force
which greatly outnumbered its opponents could not bring all its weapons to bear against
the enemy. Note that when the Weiss parameter, co, is equal to one, the Helmbold
equation is the same as the square law. However, for values less than one, only a
percentage of the square law attrition rate is applied. In effect, the intelligence
contribution offsets the Weiss parameter.
The analogy here is that since the blue force is defending in such a manner that it
can not bring direct fire from all its weapons to bear on the attacking red forces, the
inefficiencies are the same as those described in the traditional Helmbold scenario. In
other words, some of blue's direct fire weapons will not be used effectively in attnting
red. Recall that the square law assumes that every blue firer can engage every red target,
and this can be modeled with the Weiss parameter equal to one. It is necessary to make
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one change to the traditional Helmbold equation, since the force ratio term must be less
than one. Thus, for the case of blue defending against a larger red force, the equation
now is written as
£ = -Pb(|)'""b.
Note the consistencies with the original Helmbold equation. When co = 1 it reduces to
the square law, and for values < co < 1 , a percentage of the full attrition rate results.
It can be argued that there are other factors which can weigh heavily in determining
success on the battlefield, (such as command and control, morale, timeliness and
execution of the order) and therefore may have some influence on the magnitude of co.
However, in this study it is hypothesized that the differences in co are primarily due to
levels of intelligence. In Chapter IV Equation (14) will be used for curve fitting actual
attrition data from NTC battles. In this curve fitting, even though co = 1 represents blue's
highest aspirations, it is understood that this level of attrition is virtually impossible to
achieve for two reasons. First, in order to have a Weiss parameter equal to one, the unit
would have to have perfect intelligence, as well as perfect command and control, and
perfect execution, etc Secondly, the square law assumes that all blue weapons are able
to mass fires on all red targets.
Also, the lower bound of co = can only be considered a soft bound. Two battles
are fit to a curve with negative Weiss parameter values. Even though the classical
interpretation of Equation (13) does not hold for these cases, the result still serves as a
relative measure, used to compare the attrition rates in these NTC battles.
Next consider how information gained by blue regarding red's COA can be used to
increase the lethality of its own direct fire weapons. Consider the following simplified
scenario. Blue defends with 50 tanks covering five AOAs. Initially, blue has no
information about how red will allocate his forces along these AOAs. With no
knowledge, and assuming all AOAs have identical physical characteristics, he will
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allocate 20% of his direct fire assets to cover each of the five AOAs. If the battle were to
be fought under these conditions, blue would attnt red at a rate very close to the lower
bound for this situation.
Next suppose that blue has acquired some useful information from a recon element
and has adequate time to reposition his direct fire weapons so that larger portions are
bringing fire to bear on the attacking red forces. Emphasis is placed on the timeliness of
the information that blue gathers. This suggests that there is some key time period in the
battle at which go will be fixed say for example 2-6 hours before the close battle begins.
This time vanes depending on the actual characteristics of the battle. The blue
commander can also adapt to delayed information by the method in which he employs
his reserve and how long he has had to prepare supplementary fighting positions
If blue has perfect information regarding his opponent, and has had adequate time to
prepare his defense, then he would use his direct fire weapons in the most effective
manner possible In this case the magnitude of the Weiss parameter would increase.
Consider the initial conditions shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2. EXAMPLE PARAMETER VALUES FOR DIRECT FIRE MODEL
Parameter Value Units
R= 150 vehicles
B = 50 direct fire weapons
(3 B = 0.05 red attrition rate from blue direct fire weapons
0.08 fixed attntion rate for blue
Figure 4 shows the effects of changing the Weiss parameter on the attrition rate of
the opponent.
11
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Figure 4. Effects On Red's Attrition Rate For Varying Weiss Parameter Values.
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III. DATA
Data were acquired from the Army Research Institute, at the Presidio of Monterey
(ARI-POM), from 10 defensive battles fought at the National Training Center (NTC) at
Fort Irwin, California. This section describes the selection criteria used in choosing these
ten battles. These database forms include numerous database tables Additionally the
form and structure of the data provided by the ARI-POM, and how it was manipulated
and cleaned for the purpose of this thesis are discussed. These data forms include
numerous database tables as well as the narrative take home package (THP) The final
discussion describes how this information was reorganized into a consolidated data table
which will be used and expanded in Chapter IV, Analysis.
A. SOURCES
1. The National Training Center (NTC)
The mission of the NTC is to provide highly realistic and intensified combined
arms and services training for battalion task forces based in the continental United States
and squadrons in a mid- to high-intensity combat environment. Since 1981 heavy
brigades, with or without light elements, have been going to the NTC to train for 14 days
and nights on tactical missions with force-on-force Multiple Integrated Laser
Engagement System (MILES) engagements against an opposing force (OPFOR)
employing Warsaw Pact tactics The NTC schedules twelve rotations each year. On the
average, a rotation consists of nine force-on-force and four live-fire exercises for each of
the two battalion task forces.
The NTC's 1,000 square miles is considered to be some of the harshest terrain
in the U.S. Simulated combat situations constantly arise demanding rapid assessments,
timely decision making, and effective employment of artillery, air defense, engineers,
aviation, and combat service support units. No other training presents in combination the
scope, scale, and intensity of effort that is captured at the NTC. Its instrumented,
13
one-of-a-kind battlefield provides instant feedback and heightens learning at all levels.
[Ref. 6]
2. The Army Research Institute, Presidio of Monterey (ARI-POM)
The ARI-POM is designated to be the Army's repository for data collected at
the NTC as well as the other Combat Training Centers; the Combat Maneuver Training
Center (CMTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The ARI-POM
Archive is one of the prime sources of Army unit performance data in existence Initial
development of the CTC Archive began in 1985 with a limited set of NTC materials.
During the spring of 1990, the CTC Archive was expanded to include a wider variety of
paper, video, audio, and digitized data types from the JRTC and the CMTC. [Ref. 7]
B. BATTLE SELECTION CRITERIA
The goal of the battle selection criteria was to represent the population of rotations
at NTC through a sampling of NTC battles with similar characteristics. In order to
accomplish this, many battles were considered in order to find those with similar
characteristics. Listed below are the selection criteria for the NTC battles.
1. Digitized Data
Not all data from the NTC rotations on file at ARI-POM have been digitized.
However, digitized data were essential for this thesis, in order to rapidly and accurately
manipulate the large volume of data required for analysis, and to exploit the power of the
personal computer along with several software packages.
2. Mission: Defense in Sector
This type of mission is most appropriate for this thesis Gaining enemy
intelligence is most critical in a defense mission. In an offensive mission, one usually
has a good understanding of the adversary, his location, equipment, etc
3. Unit Type: Armor, Mechanized or Cavalry
These unit types were chosen to add consistency to the data. Heavy units tend
to defend using similar tactics and have nearly the same equipment, differing only in the
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proportion of tanks and APCs. In fact, at the battalion task force level, elements can be
nearly identical, and serve well for the purposes of this thesis.
4. Similar Terrain
Although it was not possible to select battles fought on exactly the same
terrain, the preference was for the battles occurring within a certain area of NTC which
offers similar major terrain features, such as defendable terrain and similar avenues of
approach, to add consistency to the data
5. Recent NTC Rotation
With the changes in equipment, tactics and with the evolving state of NTC
itself, only rotations which occurred within the past five years were candidates for
selection
C. TAKE HOME PACKAGES (THPs)
1. Description
This narrative feedback to units emphasizes a review of unit performance. For
rotations after November 1987, the reporting was within the framework of the battlefield
operating systems (BOS). THPs from earlier rotations contained the same information,
but were organized by mission [Ref. 8]. The documents, written by the officer and
non-commissioned officer (NCO) Observer/Controllers (O/Cs), are primarily narrative
with some battle statistics gathered from the Core Instrumentation Subsystem (CIS).
2. Contents/Data Elements
The THPs available on floppy disk contained four main sections, Section I -
General Summary; Section II - Mission Statements and Commander's Intent; Section III
- BOS/Lessons Learned; Section IV - Statistical Analysis [Ref. 8]. Within each section,
the mission segments were discussed as they occurred chronologically. Each document
is typically 200-250 pages in length.
Sections of particular interest for this thesis are the O/C comments on the
Intelligence and Fire Support BOSs for the particular defense-in-sector battles, and the
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consolidated comments made at the end of the rotation regarding unit trends for these
same two BOSs.
D. DATA TABLES
1. The Player Status Initialization Table (PSIT)
The PSIT describes the list of vehicles at the beginning of the defense-in-sector
mission. It includes all red and blue players as well as O/Cs [Ref 8]. The original table
included nine fields; however, only the three listed in Table 3 were used. The PSIT was
used primarily to identify the side and weapon type, given a particular Logical Player
Number (LPN). Figure 5 shows a few typical lines from a PSIT as received from the
ARI-POM
TABLE 3. FIELDS USED FROM PSIT
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
LPN Logical player number, (unique to each vehicle, all sides)
SIDE Either B(lue), R(ed) or O(bserver)
PTYPE Player type code, which is cross referenced in another table
Ipid llpn I side linst I acit ivelpt ype I org I track Ipstat
IHQ1 132 10 II 1 01 3 TOC
IHQ2 133 10 II 01 1 TOO
IHQ3 134 10 II 01 3 TOC
IHQ5 135 10 II 01 3 TOC
IHQ6 136 10 II 1 01 3 TOC
Figure 5. An Extract From The PSIT Printout
2. The Player/Vehicle/Weapon Code Table (PVWT)
The PVWT defines a unique code for each weapon system on the battlefield.
The code allows correlation of MILES codes, vehicle types, and weapons. The PVWT is
static, and does not change from rotation to rotation [Ref. 8]. The fields used from this
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table are listed in Table 4. Figure 6 shows the first few lines from the PVWT printout
from the ARI-POM.
TABLE 4. FIELDS USED FROM PVWT
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
PTYPE Player type code
WEAPON Description of unique weapon system
j
Iptype 1 vehicle
IB 1 01 Undefined
IB 1 IH60 A1/A3 Tank
IB 1 1 Abrns




IB 1 IM60 A1/A3 Tank
IB 2IAPC
IB 2IAPC
IB 1 3 1 APC
! ailea laeapon I 1
1 Unknown 01
12 1 105m tain gun
16 1 lZHM sain gun
01
01
27 1 Coax 01
261105m (-us) 01
29 1 Coax ( miss ) 01
24IM2 Machine Gun 01
29IH2 (alas) 01
7 1 TOW 01
Figure 6. An Extract From The PVWT Printout
3. The Pairing Events Table (PET)
The PET is considered by ARI-POM to be the heart of the NTC research
database This is the table that describes the direct fire assessments on a play-by-play
basis. The pairing table maintains a time-ordered record of legitimate pairing events
[Ref 8]. In a few cases the PET provided information regarding the firer, but not in
enough pairings to be of use in this thesis. The fields used from the PET are listed in
Table 5. Figure 7 shows some sample data extracted from the PET.
TABLE 5. FIELDS USED FROM THE PET
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
TIME Date and time of pairing
TLPN Logical player number of the target
RESULT N(ear miss), H(it) or K(ill)
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339IH 1 01 0IN
368IH 1 01 0IN
IB34 368IN 01 0IN
l30-Nov-89 07:44:30 ID24 394IN 01 0IN
l30-Nov-89 07:46:45
I30-NOV-89 07:47:45
IA16 98IN 01 0IN
IA65 85IH 01 0IN
I30-NOV-89 07:52:15
l30-Nov-89 07:54:34
1238 363 1 K 1 B34 3681 12 IY 1
IB60 354IK 1 01 0IN 1
Figure 7. An Extract From The PET Printout
When a vehicle is hit during a battle at NTC, an algorithm is invoked to
calculate the probability of a kill, given a hit. It takes into account the weapon and the
target types. Therefore the only lines of concern in the PET are those which represent a
kill. Hence, all Near miss and Hit pairings were deleted under the assumption that the
NTC kills are accurately assessed. The PET also showed some cases where one vehicle
was Killed more than one time. This is accurate as far as the battle play is concerned,
since in real combat vehicles have been found to have been hit numerous times But for
the required attrition calculations, we are only interested in distinct first time kills.
Therefore, pairings which represented a multiple kill on the same LPN were deleted.
4. The Player State Update Table (PSUT)
This table tracks changes to all the players' states throughout the duration of the
mission [Ref. 8]. The critical field subject to update is the Player Status Code (PSTAT).
There are many PSTATs, but the only ones of concern here are; (1) operational; and (2)
combat loss. The critical fields in this table are described in Table 6. Some example
lines from the PSUT printout are shown in Figure 8.
TABLE 6. FIELDS USED FROM THE PSUT
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
TIME Date and time of update
LPN Logical player number, (unique to each vehicle, all sides)


















11:25 IDMT 356IB 1 I 12
11:27 IDEV 303IB I 12
12:27 I21H 4IU 1 I 12
12:41 1433 128 10 I 13
13:40 I21S 13 IU 1 I 12
13:42 1117 4410 I 13









Figure 8. An Extract From The PSUT Printout
5. The Indirect Fire Casualty Table (IFCT)
The IFCT portrays indirect fire casualties similarly to PET for the direct fire
casualties. However, none of the ten battles considered had a complete IFCT No other
tabled data in the ARI-POM NTC database offer a complete picture of the indirect fire
battle.
E. REORGANIZATION OF DATA
Each of the ten battles that were selected according to the criteria listed above had
their own set of tables These tables were combined into one summarizing table which
provided all the data necessary to estimate the attrition rates for each battle The
ARI-POM tables were combined using a three dimensional spreadsheet which provided
easy cross-referencing. The Consolidated Data Table (CDT) is described in Table 7 A
few rows of the CDT are shown as an example in Figure 9.
TABLE 7. FIELDS FROM THE CDT
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
TIME Time of pairing
TLPN Logical player number of the target
RESULT N(ear miss), H(it), or K(ill)
GAME TIME Time ongin set to time of first shot of battle
KILL Running count of the total kills




RESULT Gane Tine Kill uehicle Type
66:35:06 N/fl N/fi 00:00:00 N/fi N/fi
06:36:00 148 K 00:01:00 1 R-OTHER
06:06:20 369 K 00:08:32 2 B-TQNK
06:46:58 326 K 00:11:58 3 B-fiPC
07:13:13 35 K 00:38:13 4 R-fiPC
07:13:16 66 K 00:38:16 5 R-RPC
07:14:16 42 K 00:39:16 6 R-fiPC
07:17:56 370 K 00:42:56 7 B-TANK
Figure 9. An Extract From The CDT Printout
The CDT contains all the information required to calculate the Combat
Analysis Model (COMAN) maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of attrition. These
fields and the method in which the CDT was expanded to produce these estimates are
explained in Chapter IV.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This chapter describes the method and calculations which produced the COMAN
model maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of various attrition rates from the NTC data
The interested reader can find the mathematics behind the COMAN model briefly
explained in reference 9; reference 10 contains the complete derivation and a more
complete discussion of the model, and reference 1 1 provides some interesting
applications of an extended COMAN model.
Also in this chapter, the battles are ranked according to two measures of
effectiveness (MOEs), and a positive correlation is shown to exists between how well a
unit uses its intelligence assets and their relative worth during the battle. Finally, a
method is described which quantitatively measures the effectiveness of the use of
reconnaissance and the processing of intelligence information using the NTC battle data
with the modified Helmbold equations.
A. COMAN MODEL MLE AND RELATIVE WORTH
1. COMAN Model
a. Methodology
To estimate the direct fire attrition rates from the data obtained from the
ARI-POM database, the Combat Analysis (COMAN) Model was used. The
mathematical equation for the rate at which blue attnts red using direct fire weapons is
Pb=^t I . (15)
Z B k_,(t k -t k_,)
k=l
where C? is the number of red casualties at time T, (the end of the battle), K is the total
number of casualties to both sides; B k_i is the number of blue firers after the (k- 1 )st
casualty; and (tk-tk-i) is the time in minutes between the kth and the (k-l)st












Total number of Red casualties
Total number of Blue firer minutes
'
Total number of Blue casualties
Total number of Red firer minutes
(17)
(18)
In order to use a spreadsheet to calculate |3b and Pr, the following
columns were added to the CDT described in Chapter III.
TABLE 8. COMBINED DATA TABLE DESCRIPTION
FIELD NAME FIELD DESCRIPTION
COUNT B-APC The total number of blue APCs still operational
COUNT B-TANK The total number of blue tanks still operational
COUNT R-APC The total number of red APCs still operational
COUNT R-TANK The total number of red tanks still operational
ALL BLUE The total number of blue APCs and tanks still operational
ALL RED The total number of red APCs and tanks still operational
Tk Number of minutes until the fcth kill
Bk Number of blue firers at the time of the /cth kill
Rk Number of red firers at the time of the Wh kill
T(k)-T(k-1) Number of minutes between the kth and k-1st kill
Bk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Number of blue firer minutes between the kth and k-1s\ kill
RkfT(k)-T(k-1)] Number of red firer minutes between the fcth and k-1sl kill
22
An extract from the CDT showing the new columns is shown in Figure 10
A sample calculation of the COMAN MLE of the red's attrition rate for both tanks and
APCs illustrates the procedure. Cell II is the initial number of tanks and APCs for red.
The value in cell 152 is the number of red tanks and APCs at the end of the battle The
difference in these two cells is the total number of red casualties. The value in cell K53
is the sum of cells K2 through K52, and represents the total number of blue firer minutes
For this example, according to Equation (17), the COMAN MLE for the attrition rate of
red tanks and APCs is, 15VI 32
9.376
= 0.00224. There are six different attrition rate estimates
which can be calculated in this manner; red tanks and APCs combined, red tanks, red
APCs, blue tanks and APCs combined, blue tanks, and blue APCs. The consolidated
data table (CDT) for each battle is contained in Appendix A


















47 30 98 55 77 153 77 153 N/A N/A N/A
2 47 30 98 55 77 153 1 77 153 1 77 153
3 47 29 98 55 76 153 9 76 153 8 570 1,148









50 43 25 82 51 65 133 105 68 133 1 54 106
51 43 25 81 51 68 132 107 68 132 2 102 198
52 43 25 81 51 68 132 130 68 132 23 1,557 3,023
53 9,376 18,452
Figure 10. Example Of The Additional Fields In The CDT.
b. Rank Using the COMANMLE
There are numerous possible methods for ranking the ten battles using the
data available in the ARI-POM database; the highest attrition rate, the fewest friendly
casualties, or the most enemy casualties, are just a few. If the enemy attrition rate is used
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to rank the battles, an erroneous conclusion may result. For example, Table 9 shows that
Armor battle #4 has the highest attrition rate against red, with the COMAN MLE being
0.0061 1. Armor battle #5 has a relatively low MLE of 0.00123. However, in battle #5,
there were ten more red casualties and three fewer blue casualties than in battle #4. The
COMAN MLE is a function of both red casualties, and blue firer-minutes In this
example, battle #5 lasted over 8 1/2 hours longer than did battle #4. Using enemy
attrition rate shows only that in battle #5 the casualties occurred at a slower rate. If it
were possible to select battles of nearly equal length, this MOE would be adequate.
However, that is not a viable choice for this analysis, since large differences exists for the
battle lengths.
2. Relative Worth
One MOE which is often used, and serves our purpose better, is commonly
referred to as relative worth, defined as the ratio of the attrition rate of the blue force to
the attrition rate of the red force A relative worth greater than one means that blue is
attnting red faster than red is attnting blue. Most importantly, this MOE is not a function
of the length of the battle. The last column in Table 9, relative worth, is defined as
TOTAL RED CASUALTIES
RED ATTRITION ESTIMATE
_ppj AT1VF WORTH MQi
iotai. but, casualties BLUE ATTRITION ESTIMATE
RED FTRER \flNXTF.S
Table 9 shows the actual figures for this MOE, as well as other battle summary
statistics, ranked according to relative worth.
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3 90 35 8 196 74 0.00584 0.0005 11.680
5 638 55 18 190 80 0.00123 0.00016 7688
9 711 19 11 198 53 000058 000008 7250
10 440 26 16 198 54 0.00123 0.00019 6474
4 117 45 21 202 75 0.00611 0.001 6.110
1 130 21 9 153 77 0.0024 0.00049 4898
7 132 31 18 196 79 0.00385 0.00079 4873
8 572 23 18 190 83 0.00056 0.00017 3.294
2 206 22 14 153 84 0.00214 000077 2.779
6 235 5 7 196 58 0.00041 000015 2.733
B. UNIT PERFORMANCE
1. General
One of the key postulates in this thesis is that the better a unit utilizes the
Intelligence BOS, the more effective they will be in attnting the enemy. Thus far, the
COMAN MLE has been used as an indicator of the blue force's ability to attnte the
enemy. Also available for analysis is the narrative THP which describes in detail how
the unit performed in each of the BOSs according the O/Cs at the NTC. The attempt here
is to devise a scoring system which allows the ten battles to be ranked from the best to
worst according to their THP evaluation of the Intelligence BOS. This ranking can be
compared to the ranking using the COMAN MLE and the correlation can be measured
If a positive correlation exists between these two ranking methods, then it would
reinforce the original postulate that intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination
impacts on a unit's ability to kill the enemy.
2. Methodology and Ranking
Besides the ARJ-POM mission database tables, the other source of data for the
battles is the Take Home Packet. Included in this narrative, written primarily by the
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officer and non-commissioned officer O/Cs at the NTC, is the unit's performance
evaluation regarding each of the battlefield operating systems. Since there does not
currently exist any actual performance scores for a unit by either the NTC or the
AR1-POM, a scoring system was devised which was used to rank the battles according to
the unit's performance evaluation, concentrating solely on the Intelligence BOS. The
attempt here is to assign a score to each unit regarding its efficient use of reconnaissance
assets within the Intelligence BOS. In order to obtain a value for this measure based on
the written evaluation, it is more appropriate to score each paragraph in the narrative as
opposed to each sentence, since ideally, the paragraph contains a complete thought and
cannot be taken out of context. The main difficulty was devising a scoring system which
would produce consistent results from judge to judge. There is inherently a large amount
of subjectivity to scoring a written paragraph. Therefore a scoring algorithm was devised
to remove as much of the subjectivity as possible, without loosing information, or even
worse, biasing the scores of the judges. Each paragraph within the intelligence section of
the written evaluation was placed into one of five categories by each judge.
• Highly Positive : a paragraph which contains high praise for the units
performance regarding important aspects of the Intelligence BOS. An example of
a highly positive paragraph would contain sentences like, "The template
developed by the S2 did an excellentjob of identifying MCs and avenues of
approach.
"
• Positive : a paragraph which praises the units performance, but to a lesser degree
than the above category, or it may contain a caveat. An example of a positive
paragraph may contain phrases like, "Recon and counter-recon operations were
generally, but not always executed in a timely manner.
"
• Neutral : if the paragraph does not address any pertinent topics, or the positive
comments are equally balanced with the negative comments.
• Negative : a paragraph which contains criticisms regarding the Intelligence BOS.




• Highly Negative : a paragraph which contains heavy criticism, regarding
important aspects of the Intelligence BOS. The paragraph may be one or two
very critical sentences, or it may contain numerous sentences which criticize to a
slightly lesser degree. An example of a very critical sentence contained in a
highly negative paragraph would be, "During both night operations, the platoon
was unable to detect the mounted recon before it penetrated the task force zone. "
These five categories are shown in Figure 1 1 , along with the symbols used by the
judges and the associated values used for the scoring.
Highly Positive Positive Neutral Negative Highly Negative
Judge's Rating ++ + - --
Associated Score 3 1 -1 -3
Figure 11. Scoring System For Narrative Evaluation
Appendix C contains additional instructions to the judge to ensure he
understands the purpose and definitions of the categories. These instructions include
guidelines, precautions, and a flow chart which explains the process step by step. This
was done to ensure that all the judges were assessing the same MOE. An example of
how a typical battle was scored is shown in Appendix D. Three separate judges were
asked to score all ten battles using this system, and produced remarkably consistent
results Table 8 shows their results as well as the ranking according to the battle's
relative worth (Equation 19).
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TABLE 10. RANKING OF BATTLES ACCORDING TO THE THPs AND
RELATIVE WORTH
RANK
BATTLE JUDGE 1 JUDGE 2 JUDGE 3 AVERAGE REL. WORTH
1 10 8.5 8 8.83 6
2 6 5 6.5 5.83 9
3 1 1 1 1.00 1
4 6 10 10 8.67 5
5 6 6 4 5.33 2
6 8 8.5 6.5 7.67 10
7 9 7 9 8.33 7
8 2 3 3 267 8
9 4 4 2 3.33 3
10 3 2 5 3.33 4
The Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, which measures the degree of
correspondence between rankings instead of between actual variate values, was used to
test these two ranked lists. The recommended formula [Ref. 12] for calculating this




n / .\2 n , _\2
I X-X I Y-Y
Li=l i=l
-|1 2 ' (20)
where X, and Y, are the ith elements in the two lists, and n is the number of elements in
each list. The data from the last two columns in Table 10 above, produces the
Spearman's coefficient, R = 0.49. It is encouraging that R is positive, yet due to all the
other factors which contribute to unit success, it is not extremely large. This correlation
between the performance of the unit on the battlefield and their level of proficiency in
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using their reconnaissance and intelligence assets shows that intelligence is, in fact, a
combat multiplier and should be accounted for in modeling combat attrition.
C. APPLYING THE LANCHESTERIAN TYPE EQUATIONS TO
THE NTC BATTLES
The COMAN model provides an estimate of the average attrition rate of the red
force for each of the ten NTC battles. A modified Helmbold equation having one
parameter which can be varied to model different levels of intelligence is also used In
Figure 12, the modified Helmbold equation is plotted with three different Weiss
parameter values for Battle #10. It is relatively straightforward to see that in this battle,
the red attrition rate could be represented using the modified Helmbold equation with a
Weiss parameter of approximately 0.50.
As discussed in Chapter II, there are many factors which influence whether or not a
unit is successful in battle Therefore it is possible for a unit to have perfect intelligence
regarding its enemy and attnt him at a rate less than the perfect square law due to
command and control, morale, execution, etc. This phenomenon may be present in
Battle fflO, shown in Figure 12, which is the battle where the COMAN MLE was fit to
the curve with the highest parameter value. co = 5, and yet is still quite far from the
square law.
Examining Battle #10 more closely raises an interesting point. It appears that it
would make a great difference in the Weiss parameter value if the start of the battle was
chosen differently. In fact the COMAN estimate of (3b more than doubles if the start of
the battle is moved forward about five hours. However, Figure 13 shows that in this case
the Weiss parameter fit of 0.48 is nearly the same What has occurred in this example is
the smaller blue force size has offset the effect of the increased attrition coefficient.
Figure 14 shows a plot of the blue force size over the course of the entire battle. Notice
that blue suffered about 10 percent casualties, (nearly half of its total casualties for the
battle) during the first five hours of the fighting, while red lost only about 2 percent The
decrease in the force size, B, and necessarily the force ratio component, |, offset the
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increase in the magnitude of the attrition coefficient, Pb, resulting in effectively no
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- Red Actual - COMAN MLE same as Wees = 50
Figure 12. Coman Estimate And Modified Helmbold Equations Of Battle #10
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Comparison of Model with Actual Battle Data






- Red Actual - COMAN MLE same as Wees = A6\
Figure 13. Battle #10 With The Modified Start Time
Battle #10 depicts realistically what often occurs in battle. As an attacking force
approaches its opponent, the weapons with the greatest effective range are employed
first. In this case, blue suffered substantial casualties in the long range battle, but did
much better in the subsequent fighting at closer ranges. The battlefield can essentially be
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divided into range bands which correspond to the weapons systems with various effective
ranges. In fact, the original work conducted by Clark used this approach in calculating
separate attrition estimates for each range band [Ref. 9]. However, the data available for
this thesis did not provide the necessary information to incorporate this level of detail.




















OOrOO-OO 0100:00 O20&00 03:00:00 04:00:00 05:00:00 06:00:00
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070O00
Figure 14. Blue Force Size For Battle #10
The lower bound of (O = can only be considered a soft bound. Two of the NTC
battles are fit to a curve with negative Weiss parameter values. Even though the classical
interpretation of Helmbold's formulations do not hold for these cases, the result still
serves as a relative measure used to compare the attrition rates in these NTC battles.
Battle #2 is an example of a negative value, where the COMAN MLE is fit to the curve,
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co = —0. 13, as shown in Figure 15. The graphs for all ten battles are contained in
Appendix E. Table 1 1 shows all ten battle with the associated Weiss parameter value
Comparison of Model with Actual Battle Data
Battle *2
- Actual Data COMAN MLE same as Wees = -0 13
Figure 15. C'oman Estimate And Modified Helmbold Equations Of Battle #2
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TABLE 11. WEISS PARAMETER FOR EACH NTC BATTLE












V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED
FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
Through the modified Helmbold equations a quantitative measure of the value of
reconnaissance can be obtained. Simulations can be run to determine the benefits of new
systems, tactics and force structures. Prior to the close battle, periodic updates of -^ and
a) can be calculated. Through these updates, the lethality of the defending force's
indirect and direct fire weapons increases accordingly. The parameters become fixed at
some given point and the battle is fought.
B. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH
Possibly the most appropriate model for these equations is the Future Theater Level
Model (FTLM), since it uniquely incorporates perceptions into the battle simulation.
FTLM is a symbolic model characterized by its aggregated, stochastic,
information-intensive, and dynamic nature [Ref. 13] However, it may be necessary to
restructure portions of the FTLM in order to simulate combat at the small unit level.
Along with this is the requirement to incorporate the modified Helmbold equations
presented in this study into the FTLM program code. The most natural approach would
be to associate the magnitude of the Weiss parameter to how close the unit's perception
regarding its enemy's COA is to the ground truth. Currently the Naval Postgraduate
School is pursuing these topics for upcoming theses.
Further studies could help to better identify the upper and lower bounds on the
Weiss parameter. As was stated, the upper bound lies somewhere below one, and it is
possible using real data to obtain parameter values less than zero for the lower bound
Additional research to obtain attrition rates for the heterogeneous case could also be
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APPENDIX A
CONSOLIDATED DATA TABLES (CDTS)
This appendix contains the CDTs for the ten defensive battles conducted at NTC.
Below is a description of the column headings for quick reference.
Column Heading Description
1 Time Time of the actual battle
2 Target LPN Target logical player number, (unique to each vehicle)
3 Result Ail the painngs in this table are (K)ills
4 Game Time Duration of the battle
5 Kill Running total of how many vehicles for both sides are killed
6 Vehicle Type Denotes the side, (B)lue or (R)ed, and TANK, APC or OTHER
7 Count B-APC Current number of mission capable blue APCs
8 Count B-Tank Current number of mission capable blue tanks
9 Count R-APC Current number of mission capable red APCs
10 Count R-Tank Current number of mission capable red tanks
11 All Blue Current number of mission capable blue vehicles
12 All Red Current number of mission capable red vehicles
13 Tk Game time (in minutes) of the kth kill
14 Bk Total number of blue vehicles at the time of the kth kill
15 Rk Total number of red vehicles at the time of the kth kill
16 T(k)-T(k-1) Time (in minutes) between the (k-1)st and the kth kill
17 Bk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated blue firer minutes between the (k-l)st and kth kill
18 Rk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated red firer minutes between the (k-1)st and kth kill
19 Tk Game time (in minutes) of the kth kill
20 Bk(APC) Total number of blue APCs at the time of the kth kill
21 Rk(APC) Total number of red APCs at the time of the kth kill
22 T(k)-T(k-1) Time (in minutes) between the (k-1)st and the kth kill
23 BkrT(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated blue APC firer minutes between the (k-l)st and kth kill
24 Rk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated red APC firer minutes between the (k-1)st and kth kill
25 Tk Game time (in minutes) of the kth kill
26 Bk(Tank) Total number of blue tanks at the time of the kth kill
27 Rk(Tank) Total number of red tanks at the time of the kth kill
28 T(k)-T(k-1) Time (in minutes) between the (k-1)st and the kth kill
29 Bk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated blue tank firer minutes between the (k-1)st and kth kill
30 Rk[T(k)-T(k-1)] Accumulated red tank firer minutes between the (k-1)st and kth kill
At the bottom of each
which represent the total firer
table is the total for columns 17, 18, 21, 22, 27, and 28,
minutes for the battle for the associated side and vehicle.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Relative Worth 4.59 in 11.66 6.1 7.87 2.69 4.85 3.34 7.21 6.5
Battle Length
(hhmmss)
2:09:41 2:10:19 1:29:41 1:57:10 10:37:19 3:54:38 2:12:09 9:36:21 11:50:36 7:21:56


























1 Armor 30 47 77 3,553 5,822 9,375 5 4 9 0.00729 0.000345 0.000488
2 Armor 35 49 84 4,116 6,164 10,280 10 4 14 0.001513 0.000345 0.00077
3 Armor 36 38 74 3,008 3,365 6,373 7 1 8 0.000848 0.000129 0.000501
4 Armor 42 33 75 4,046 3,483 7,529 16 5 21 0.00146 0.0005 0.001002
5 Armor 32 48 80 16,272 29,834 46,106 14 4 18 0000238 0.000071 0.000156
6 Cav 41 17 58 8,318 3,992 12,310 7 7 0.000305 0.000154
7 Mech 22 57 79 2,025 6,810 8,835 10 8 18 0000868 000717 0.000793
8 Mech 29 54 83 15,294 29,534 44,828 8 10 18 0.000148 0.000188 0.000169
9 Mech 40 13 53 25,494 9,159 34,653 10 1 11 0.000145 0.000015 0.00008
10 Mech 41 13 54 16,033 5,311 21,344 15 1 16 0.000347 0.000024 0.000189





























1 MRR 55 98 153 6,857 11,595 18,452 4 17 21 001126 0.00292 0.00224
2 MRR 56 97 153 6,609 11,580 18,189 9 13 22 0.002186 0.002109 0.00214
3 MRR 98 98 196 8,255 7,727 15,982 11 24 35 0.004041 0.007428 000584
4 MRR 101 101 202 10,959 10,008 20,967 16 29 45 0.003954 0.008614 0.00611
5 MRR 95 95 190 58,944 56,156 115,100 16 39 55 0.001015 0.001341 0.001228
6 MRR 98 98 196 22,969 22.542 45,511 1 4 5 0000124 0.001002 0.000414
7 MRR 98 98 196 11,527 11,164 22,691 14 17 31 0.006913 0.002937 0.003848
8 MRR 95 95 190 54,173 53,206 107,379 9 14 23 000059 0000542 0.000564
9 MRR 99 99 198 69,153 68,786 137,939 8 11 19 0.000314 0.00131 0.000577
10 MRR 99 99 198 43.189 42,269 85,458 10 16 26 0.000623 0.003013 0.001228
Attrition rate values are the COMAN MLE attrition rate estimate.
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS TO SCORER OF THP NARRATIVE
Shown below are the instructions provided to the judges who scored the THPs
1. Use the flowchart on the following page as a guideline.
2. Example of what might be considered a very positive comment within a
paragraph:
"The template developed by the S2 did an excellent job of identifying MCs and
avenues of approach "
3. Example of what might be considered a very negative comment within a
paragraph:
"However the avenues of approach analysis were not continuous throughout the
sector nor were the MCs through the Furlong and the Whale identified. The TF was
aware of the dismounted avenues of approach, but these were not adequately analyzed "
4. Look for key words and phrases that indicate the correct subject matter.
(i.e. IPB, DST, R&S, Terrain Analysis, Tracking of enemy recon elements, Identification
of enemy avenues of approach or MCs or COAs, etc.)
5. Consider the relative time of the events being discussed in the narrative.
Some have more impact than others.
(i.e. early tracking of enemy recon elements is almost certainly more important to
this analysis than events that occurred in the counter attack.
)
6. I realize that many paragraphs are not well written, and many are nothing
more than stand alone sentences. Feel free to group them as you wish and score
them collectively. I just ask that you draw arrows and braces so I know how
you scored them.
7. Beware ofpreaching that can occur from the author of the THP narrative.
8. Note that the second portion of the THP narrative is consolidated






Score ++ Score +
-No-
Yes




SAMPLE SCORING OF THP NARRATIVE
A sample battle THP narrative is shown here with the scores displayed in the text
box to the right of each paragraph. There are two scored sections in each of the THPs.
Any key statements within the sentence are shown in bold typeface. The first section
comments on the BOSs, and the second discusses performance trends. Any references to
the rotation number or unit designation have been removed or disguised.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATING SYSTEMS
1. MISSION: DEFENSE IN SECTOR
a. SUMMARY OF EXECUTION
( 1 ) THE S2
The staff synchronization by the battalion staff improved
in regards to the development of the DST. The S2 still was not given
adequate time to prepare IPB for the planning staff and was forced to
provide cursory support He was able to fully develop the basic IPB
products in time for distribution during the OPORD. The staff
developed a fairly complete DST, yet due to heavy attrition of the
command and control elements at the preliminary stages of the battle, the
identified decisions were not executed. The template developed by the
S2 did an excellent job of identifying MCs and avenues of approach,
with the exception of two dismounted routes in the southern AOs, and
through the area known as John Wayne Pass, by which the OPFOR
actually conducted dismounted operations. Timelining the advancing





The counter-reconnaissance plan developed by the S2
and S3 lacked the necessary synchronization to make it effective.
This coordination also involves ensuring that all elements execute their
tasks and are sufficiently resourced to conduct their mission, to include
having adequate and operational night sights, operational radios, and
graphics. Timely execution of assigned tasks are also critical, especially
when it comes to a counter-reconnaissance mission. When all of these
shortfalls were combined (i.e., scouts executing security screen late
and without proper night vision capabilities, and inadequate handoff
between tracking and destruction assets), you will repeatedly have




The S2 was able to maintain a timely track of the
counter- recon battle and made an estimate of the probable COAs by
the enemy based upon the known reconnaissance effort. He also was
able to maintain an accurate assessment of what elements had been
destroyed and what remained. The TOC was destroyed during the early
phase of the battle by enemy reconnaissance elements and the S2's track
of the main battle ended prior to the enemy actually entering the task
force's AO. Other intelligence concerns observed during the operation
included the use of proper radio techniques on unsecure radio nets and
establishment of local security for the TOC, both which dealt with




The scout platoon was to occupy a stationary screen
forward of the task force during a defense in sector.
(b) PLAN
The platoon was to occupy three scout OPs, two on
Furlong Ridge and one in the John Wayne Hills, with GSR and LRP
teams attached. The platoon was to conduct the operation during both






The platoons preparation prior to each mission has
continued to improve, particularly in the area of PCC/PCI, weapon test
fire, and OP/ patrol preparation; however, the platoon has yet to conduct
any leader recon or rehearsals in conjunction with the OPORDs.
Paragraph
Score:
The platoon did not occupy its screen until 040900
Mar 89; consequently, they did not participate in the first night
counter-recon operation during the DRT insertion. The platoon's
ability to detect the OPFOR recon on 5 Mar 89 was severely limited due
to the lack of thermal devices (none on hand) During the mission, the
platoon was unable to track the regiment because it was attrited by





Observations of Task Force 3-70, Armor's, intel operations
covered the areas of planning, preparation, and execution of missions,





The DST generally was developed after the formal planning
session (war-gaming process) and was merely a reflection of the plan.
This did not allow the staff to confirm or deny the capabilities and/or
limitations of their assets to execute the plan and thus reduce the
changes which might be made prior to production and distribution of
the DST. Staff interaction by the S2 started out at an acceptable level.
At the end of the training period, levels of coordination and
synchronization between the S2 and the FSO, the staff engineer and the
ALO as well as ADA officer had improved, especially in the development
of the situation template. Adjacent unit coordination was generally
affected either by radio or by on the ground coordination at brigade,
but this did not occur every mission. Consequently, the S2 did not
always have knowledge of the adjacent units recon/counter-recon
effort until his own plan had been finalized. The most serious
problem observed involving the S2 in the planning process was the
commander allowing him sufficient time to develop a preliminary IPB
product to support the planning process. He frequently had to brief
from the brigade product without the opportunity to refine the
product for the task force's specific AO.
Paragraph
Score: -
The S2 was always abreast of the status of the
recon/counter-recon effort, his situation template was up-to-date and
he continually studied and analyzed his SITMAP for new
observations and analysis to disseminate.
Observations of intel operations during the execution phase of the
mission involved the tracking of the battle in terms of friendly and enemy
activities, analysis, and dissemination of SPOTREPs (to and from higher
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headquarters). The attempts to track the battle were progressive;
however, available information did not always enhance the process and
ultimately reduced the S2's ability to quickly analyze and evaluate the
situation in reference to those COAs available to the OPFOR. Improving
the quantity and quality of spot reporting, to include enemy BDA, would
have greatly enhanced his efforts to conduct analysis.
Paragraph
Score:
Recon and counter-recon operations were generally, but not
always, executed in a timely manner. Planning for the missions
always occurred early to allow the elements executing the plan more
time for planning internally and for execution. Heavy reliance was
placed upon establishing OPs for collection of information, and the scouts
were seldom given route, zone, or area recon missions. When the scouts
were given a mobile mission, it usually involved screening the task force's
flank. OPs were generally limited in collection capabilities by
communications equipment and visibility conditions, which can be
affected by weather, terrain, or smoke operations. Survivability of OPs
was limited by mobility and enemy direction finding efforts during the
reporting process Overall, recon plans were generally executed




Finally, administrative operations during the training period
were commendable. The journal improved and became a valuable
tool in the tracking process. The SITMAP was constantly updated to
show the latest intel. Operations maximized the use of resources and
personnel. Graphics and annexes for the OPORD were always ready
for distribution during the OPORD.
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Operations security needs emphasis and improvement across
the task force. Light discipline, radio procedures and garbage and
sanitation control all need improvement to ensure that the




Total "++" paragraphs: 3x3 = 9
Total "+" paragraphs: 2x1=2
Total "0" paragraphs: 5x0 =
Total "-" paragraphs: 3 x (- 1 ) = -3
Total "- -" paragraphs: x (-3) =
Score for battle: 9 + 2-3 = 8
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APPENDIX E
COMPARISON OF MODEL WITH ACTUAL BATTLE
DATA
This appendix contains graphs for each of the ten NTC battles, which compare
the COMAN maximum likelihood estimate of red's attrition rate to the modified
Helmbold equation with the Weiss parameter set at 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0 A plot of the actual
red force size for each battle is also included.
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Comparison of Model with Actual Battle Data
Battle #4
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Comparison of Model with Actual Battle Data
Baffle #9
Weiss = 0.0
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